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This essay will briefly review the background of the use of the armed
forces in a police capacity, discuss the growth of that role in the I980s and
1990s, and forecast an even greater expansion into that role in the near future
due to the emerging threat of "catastrophic terrorism." It will contend that this
increased reliance on military resources for policing is not in the interest of
either the armed forces or the public. Finally, it will make some observations
with a view towards minimizing the dangers of police-ization of the military
while ensuring the Nation's public safety.
INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 1997 a young American shot a Texas high school
sophomore to death. Another instance of gang violence? No. In this case the
shooter was a U.S. Marine on an anti-drug patrol along the Rio Grande, a
military operation that was part of a large border surveillance project conducted
under the aegis of Joint Task Force (JTF) 6. 2 The Marine mistook as a threat to
his life - and that of the Marines with him - the teenager who, though armed
with a rifle, was merely tending a herd of goats. Although a subsequent
investigation revealed that the shooting was a tragic culmination of mistakes and
misperceptions,l the incident served to awaken many Americans to the perils of
employing the military for domestic security, a function historically the
province of civilian law enforcement personnel.
This essay will briefly review the background of the use of the armed
forces in a police capacity, discuss the growth of that role in the 1980s and
1990s, and forecast an even greater expansion into that role in the near future
due to the emerging threat of "catastrophic terrorism." It will contend that this
increased reliance on military resources for policing is not in the interest of
either the armed forces or the public. Finally, it will make some observations
with a view towards minimizing the dangers of police-ization of the military
while ensuring the Nation's public safety.
lThe views and opinions he presents are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the
Department of Defense or any of its components. Copyright ©1999, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
2Joint

Task Force 6 is a multi-service organization tasked to provide surveillance for Federal agents
in border areas. "While not allowed to make arrests, they have carried out hundreds of observation
sorties along the border, passing on information to the Border Patrol and drug-enforcement agents"
(Verhovek,1997:12).
3The Marine responsible for the shooting was never prosecuted (SUfO, 1998:3).
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BACKGROUND
Americans have traditionally viewed with suspIcion the use of the
armed forces for any sort of internal security purpose. These misgivings can be
traced to the antipathy towards standing armies, which is as old as the nation
itself (Kohn, 1975:3-9). English colonists, cognizant of the excesses of Oliver
Cromwell's New Model Army during the English Civil War (Fields and Hardy,
1992:9-13; Carr, 1990:82), were wary of the nefarious potential of a
professional military used at home. A further catalyst for this nascent
antimilitarism arose when Royal troops were employed to suppress the growing
independence movement in the Colonies (Fields & Hardy, 1992:25-26).
Resistance to a law enforcement function for military forces hardly
diminished following the American Revolution. Indeed, in framing the
Constitution, one of the main aims was to limit the role of military forces in
domestic activities. The final document provides relatively few authorities for
employing the military within the Nation's borders. Article I §8, for example,
allows Congress to provide for "calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union and to suppress Insurrections." Additionally, there is the language of
Article IV §4 which requires the federal government to protect the states against
invasion and "on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."
As is suggested above, the Framers intended that the needs of national
defense would be principally served by reliance not upon full-time regulars, but
on part-time state-based militias. Even though the militia system seldom
worked as originally designed, for much of the Nation's history relatively small
professional forces were augmented in wartime by huge increases in recruitment
and conscription. Though this ad hoc approach met with mixed success in
fighting the nation's wars, it essentially remained in place until threat of the
Soviet Union in the 1950s necessitated the maintenance of an enormous
. peacetime military establishment during the Cold War.
Consequently, there have been relatively few occasions where troops
have functioned in what would be considered today as policemen. A major
deviation from this norm took place during the Civil War era. Spurred by the
Confederate insurgency, martial law was implemented in various areas of the
North (Fairman, 1943: 108-116). When this exercise of military power extended
to the trial of civilians by military commission, the Supreme Court eventually
intervened. In the case of Ex Parte Milligan,4 the Court held that conducting
such trials where the civil courts remained open was beyond the powers of the
armed forces, despite the existence of a civil war. 5

471 U.S. 2 (1866).
SFor a discussion of Milligan and other cases addressing civil liberties in wartime, see Rehnquist's
All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (1998).
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Nevertheless, in the post-Civil War era federal troops were used
extensively to police the South for over twenty years. Again, however, the
wisdom of this strategy was questioned, this time by the legislative branch.
According to one treatise, "Reconstruction era abuses, culminating in the use of
federal troops to police polling stations in Southern States (some say to
influence the outcome of the presidential election of 1876) led to the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act" (Dycus, Berney, Banks, and Raven-Hansen, 1990:427). That
Act6 criminalizes any use of the armed forces to execute the laws except as may
be specifically authorized by Congress.
Despite the fact that there has never been a prosecution for a violation
of the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 for the latter part of the nineteenth and all of the
twentieth century it served to limit the role of the military in anything
resembling ordinary police work (except perhaps in the context of constabulary
duties in frontier areas). Of course, throughout U.S. history military forces have
been used to enforce civil law against domestic violence, mostly to suppress
riots and similar civil disorders; in particular, troops were used on several
occasions to counter labor unrest (Engdahl, 1971). But such uses were
exceptions to the general rule against the regular use of military force for policelike duties.
That paradigm began evolving in the early 1980s with the onset of the
drug crisis. Cognizant of the international dimensions of the drug trade,
convinced that local police forces were being overwhelmed by the problem, and
impressed with the efficiency and renewed popularity of the armed forces,
Congress passed a number of statutes designed to bring military resources to
bear on the "war" on drugs. These statutes,S still in effect today, permit the use
of military equipment and expertise in support of civilian law enforcement
agencies. However, the law still prohibits a military member from "direct
participation" in most circumstances in the "search, seizure, arrest, or other
similar activity.,,9 Separate legislative authority designates the Department of

618 U.S.c. §1385.
'During the siege at Wounded Knee, SO, plaintiffs seeking damages following a stand off with a
group of armed Indians argued that the Army and the Air Force were used in violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act. The court concluded that although military personnel did furnish advice and
equipment, this did not constitute "execution" of the laws in violation of the Act. In dicta,
however, the court did observe that uses of the armed forces contrary to the Act could result in a
finding that evidence thereby obtained was in admissible. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, affd,
800 F. 2d 812 (8 1h Cir, 1986) (en bane), affd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988). Thus, litigation involving the
Act occasionally appears but in the context of using it as an exclusionary rule, not as the basis for a
criminal prosecution itself.

'See Chapter 18 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
"10 U.S.c. §375.

r
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Defense (DoD) as the lead agency for the "detection and monitoring of aerial
and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.,,10
It is important to observe that these strictures do not necessarily limit
the authority of state forces - to include the National Guard - unless and
untilthey are federalized. II This important legal distinction is often lost on the
public. Given that the Guard's uniforms and equipment is virtually identical to
that of the regular armed forces, this perception is wholly understandable. Still,
the ever more frequent use of Guard personnel for drug operations and other law
enforcement functions serves to acclimate the public to the notion of uniformed
military personnel performing such duties.
In any event, the end result of almost two decades of statutory change
and billions of dollars in budgetary expenditures is the entrenchment of both
regular and part-time military personnel in a variety of counterdrug efforts, 12
including JTF 6. In addition, there have been calls to use troops to augment
police forces in high-crime, drug-infested urban areas (e.g., O'Neill, 1994:11).
Clearly, more than anything else the drug problem has pushed the armed forces
into institutionalized participation in law enforcement matters.
Counterdrug activities and the new statutes supporting them have also
stimulated much collaboration between police and military forces. This has
contributed to the 'militarization' of police forces as they incorporate a widerange of military equipment into their inventories (e.g., Police Get Gadgetry ... ,
1998:C4), and tum to the military for advice and training (e.g., Loder, 1994:35).
In important ways we are witnessing a problematic convergence of police and
military interests.
THE FUTURE
The involvement of the armed forces in what might be considered
police or law enforcement activities is poised to increase exponentially in the
near future. This is largely because of the growing threat of terrorism. While
terrorism has a long history, consciousness of its dangers in the U.S. has risen
markedly in the past few years. Bombings at New York's World Trade Center
and Oklahoma City's Murrah Federal Building underlined terrorism's potential.
Still, as destructive as those events were, they were efficiently investigated and
the perpetrators quickly apprehended by law enforcement agencies with little
help from the military.
But even greater focus on terrorism was generated by the 1995 attack
in Tokyo. In that event a religious cult released the deadly gas sarin in a subway
leaving 12 people dead and over 2,500 injured. Such incidents have spawned
WIO U.S.C. §124.
liThe National Guard is a hybrid organization having both state and federal status (Rich, 1994:35).
'2Jim Garamone, DoD Actively Supports Counterdrug Efforts, American Forces Information
Service, Nov. 1998, found at www.defenselink.mil/newslNovI998/nl1301998_9811303.html
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fear of what is termed "catastrophic terrorism" (e.g., Lewis, 1998:9). This
insidious peril is usefully divided into two forms for purposes of this analysis: 1)
that involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons; and 2) that involving threats to microchip-based
information and computer systems so critical to modem societies.
With the new awareness have come new calls to use the armed forces
to confront this unprecedented security challenge. 13 In a sense, the use of the
military to confront these perils parallels the rationale for its use in the more
traditional domestic role of the suppression of civil disorders and even its newer
role in drug interdiction. Specifically, the threats have the potential to
overwhelm police resources because of the emerging capability of a relatively
small numbers of non-state actors to use WMD to inflict casualties on a wartime
scale (e.g., Bayles, 1998:1).
There have been a variety of DoD responses to the threat of
catastrophic terrorism. Today, for example, the armed forces operate the
Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) in the Pentagon. This organization
serves as nerve center for military involvement in all kinds of domestic activities
ranging from the "presidential inaugurations and Olympic Games to terrorist
bombings and urban riots" (Blazar, 1998: 12).
In addition, the Pentagon is responsible for the Domestic Preparedness
Program, an ambitious effort to train local police, fire, and medical personnel to
deal with the dangers posed by biological and chemical devices. 14
Complementing this effort was the formation of several special military units to
counter the WMD threat both at home and abroad (Graham, 1997: 1). In
addition, the National Guard is organizing 170 reconnaissance and
decontamination teams to respond to domestic WMD attacks (Ruppe, 1998: 1).
A related but somewhat different dilemma is presented by the threat to
the nation's computer and communications systems. Many experts had long
argued that the U.S. was extremely vulnerable to what has been called
"cyberterrorism" or "information warfare" (Schwartau, 1996). Recently, the
President, following the recommendations of his Critical Infrastructure
Protection Commission, sought $1.4 billion for his Fiscal Year 2000 budget to
develop systems to protect the Nation's banking, electric, transportation, and
other critical industries (Harreld, 1999: 1).

IlFor example, Section 324(4) of Public Law 104-132 (cited at 22 V.S.C. §2377 note) states that
Congress find that "the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and
military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international
terrorists. including overseas training facilities and safe havens" (emphasis added).

"See 10 V.S.C §382. The effort reportedly has met with mixed success (Bayles, 1998:1).

I
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For the U.S. military cyberterrorism is an especially serious problem as
it is heavily dependent upon computers for its daily operations, and it relies
upon many of the same micro-based communication and electronic systems
used by the general public (Office of Under Secretary ... , 1996). Thus, wholly
apart from any abstract desire to aid civilian law enforcement agencies, the
armed forces have a very great interest in analyzing and defeating this kind of
threat. And that threat is real: during an exercise in June 1997 it was discovered
that DoD computer systems were far more vulnerable than had been previously
thought.
As a consequence, the Pentagon recently announced the formation of a
Joint Task Force Network Defense. This organization currently has the limited
mission of defending DoD computers (Wolfe, 1999: 1). However, newly-issued
Pentagon doctrine suggests that protection of the Nation's information
infrastructure is properly a responsibility of DoD (Chairman, 1998).
The enormous scope of the threat of catastrophic terrorism has also
generated suggestions for new organizations within the armed forces. Most
recently, a plan has been proposed to establish a single military commander with
authority to oversee domestic defense in the event of terrorist attack. According
to press reports, this "homeland defense" commander "would have the knowhow and authority to quickly dispatch technicians and troops who could help
deal with terrorist attacks that officials fear could inflict thousands of casualties
and disrupt whole cities" (Richter, 1999:3).
THE EMERGING ISSUES
What we have seen in the last twenty years is an increasing policeization of the military, that is, a growing tendency to look to the armed forces to
perform tasks that are, essentially, law enforcement in nature. To many
Americans the use of the military for these purposes is of little concern to them.
The armed forces consistently lead public opinion polls as the most trusted
institution in American society, toping even organized religion and the Supreme
Court. Moreover, as John Hillen, then an analyst for the Heritage Foundation,
put it in 1996: "Why do politicians want to use the military for police duties? To
take advantage of one of the few parts of the federal government that actually
works" (Hillen, 1996:2).
Notwithstanding the seeming acquiescence of the public, this growing
trend bears further analysis. In truth, there are very few models in modem times
where the military effectively conducted a police-like internal security mission
consistent with both the maintenance of an authentic combat capability and
democratic values. That said, the issues with regard to police-ization of the
armed forces can usefully be divided into practical problems and philosophical
ones.
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THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
One of the principal reasons that many military leaders have long
resisted employing their troops as police forces relates to the very practical
concern that doing so diminishes combat prowess. Despite what the casual
observer may think, there are surprisingly few synergies between law
enforcement and military missions.
Examining the border shooting incident provides an illustration. There
the Marine Corps insisted that the patrol acted in accordance with the "JTF-6
rules of engagement of which include the inherent right of self-defense"
(Martin, 1998: I). Though resolution of the specific facts of that case is beyond
the scope of this article, it is easy to see how a dichotomy might arise. Military
forces operating in a domestic situation where the rules of engagement limit the
use of force to "self-defense" situations might still have an interpretation of the
scope of the term that differs from that of local police forces. Under military
practice force may be used in self-defense to "decisively counter the hostile act
or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces." Moreover,
under certain conditions, engagement is permitted "until hostile force no longer
presents an imminent threat" (Chairman, 1994:EncA).
However, state law, not military doctrine, governs when military forces
are acting domestically against civilian suspects outside of a federal enclave.
Accordingly, the legal authority to use deadly force in such situations may only
be that available to any citizen (as opposed to law enforcement officer) in a
particular jurisdiction (Torcia, 1979:§125). Thus, state legal requirements that
mandate actions such as "retreat to the wall" before the use of deadly force is
permitted lS are unknown in military practice and unlikely to be well understood
by troops in the field.
Indeed, using military forces for tasks that are essentially law
enforcement in nature requires a fundamental change in orientation. To put it
bluntly, in its most basic iteration military training is aimed at killing people and
breaking things. Consequently, military doctrine has forces moving on a target
by fire and maneuver with a view towards destroying that target. Police forces,
on the other hand, take a very different approach. They have to exercise the
studied restraint that a judicial process requires. They gather evidence and
arrest suspects. Where the military sees enemies of the United States, a police
agency - properly oriented - sees citizens suspected of crimes but innocent until
proven guilty in a court of law. These are two different views of the world.
Thus, it is difficult for military personnel trained under a regime that
emphasizes combat skills to easily align themselves with the more restrained
procedure required for police work in a democratic society. When forced into
such situations, military personnel tend to revert to the combat-oriented
architecture that they understand and in which they are comfortable operating.
15See id., § 126.

....~
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Thus, it is not surprising that, for example, Marine officers would characterize
their deployment during the 1992 Los Angeles riots in the military coda of
"Domestic Peacekeeping". More troubling, but still comprehensible given their
background and training, are reports that some Marines "when faced with
violating doctrine or violating federal law ... chose the latter course" (Ricks,
1996:21-22).
It is, of course, possible to train military personnel to suppress their
previously instilled combat instincts to perform in the more restricted law
enforcement environment. However, once military personnel are converted into
effective policemen, the very ethos that makes them succeed in combat has been
dangerously eroded. The restraint so necessary for law enforcement could be
catastrophic in war. Years before the 1997 JTF-6 incident, a colonel observing
Marines firing warning shots during a border skirmish with smugglers later
argued that "combat-trained Marines shouldn't be diminishing hard-learned
skills by squeezing off warning shots" (Torque and Waller, 1990: 18).
Even when training succeeds in sufficiently purging military personnel
of their combat skills so that they conduct themselves appropriately as law
enforcement agents, a significant and costly commitment must be made to
retrain them back into warfighting mindset once those duties are completed. In
an era of fewer and fewer troops and more and more commitments commanders
are understandably reluctant to do anything that saps combat readiness.
Another factor contributing to the reluctance of military commanders
to become involved in law enforcement activities is the potential damage to
morale and discipline that may result. It is mistaken to assume that an
individual who joins an all-volunteer force such as the U.S. military is
necessarily inclined to perform domestic police duties. Quite obviously, if that
were his or her personal inclination they would have joined a police force.
Moreover, while military personnel may be mentally well equipped to deal with
a vicious battlefield adversary, they are rather less prepared to deal with a
sophisticated criminal aiming to corrupt them. 16 Military leaders simply do not
wish to expose their troops to this kind of influence.
Additionally, military officers also believe that using military personnel
for domestic law enforcement purposes carries great potential to harm civilmilitary relations. It can bring the military in conflict with civilian society and
aggravate what many see as a growing estrangement of the military from the
society it serves (Ricks, 1996:21-22). The uproar following the shooting in
Texas is just one example. This may be one reason why the Secretary of
Defense radically narrowed the circumstances under which such armed patrols
might take place (Ground Troop ... , 1999:1).

16Indeed, some criminals have succeeded in corrupting military personnel (e.g., Reza, 1998: I).
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But it is the emergence of "catastrophic terrorism" that portends the
circumstance with the greatest potential to draw military personnel into
domestic security situations. On one hand, the immensity of threat necessitates
military involvement, especially when WMD is involved, as only the armed
forces have the infrastructure and training to meet the challenge of mass
casualties. Other, technical aspects of catastrophic terrorism, will likely pull
military personnel into law enforcement duties more directly, although
inadvertently.
Consider the menace of "cyberattack." It presents a particular
conundrum for military officials because of the technical difficulty of
distinguishing between assaults carried out by clever teenagers on a lark and
those conducted by cyberterrorists and enemy nation-states bent on inflicting
grievous damage to U.S. national security. Given that at the time of a particular
assault on a DoD computer system it may be impossible to know the identity of
the attacker, military personnel could find themselves aggressively responding
against a fellow citizen in a manner appropriate to a hostile foreign force, but
inconsistent with what an American rightly expects when merely suspected of a
crime.
Conceiving of terrorists as criminals entitled to due process is not
intuitive to military personnel or, for that matter, the terrorists themselves.
Many terrorists and terrorist organizations like to portray themselves as
"soldiers" engaged in "wars" against the U.S. and other mainly Western nations.
However, both historical and current practice in the U.S. usually characterizes
them as common criminals. 17 There are several reasons for this approach, not
the least of which is the fact that under international law, lawful combatants in
armed conflict are privileged from prosecution for violent acts that are otherwise
in compliance with the law of war. In addition, combatants are entitled to POW
status if captured.
Terrorists do not ordinarily achieve status as lawful combatants in
armed conflict because the international law of war principally governs conflicts
between nation-states and certain internationally recognized entities.18 Though
the law of war does apply to certain groups of irregular belligerents, terrorists
also ordinarily fail to meet the minimum legal standards applicable to such
forces in that they fail to carry arms openly, wear a distinctive uniform or
symbol, and subject themselves to internal military discipline aimed at enforcing
the law of war.

11

17At least one authority contends that some terrorists may also be considered as unlawful
combatants in an armed conflict (e.g., Erickson, 1989).

"This analysis is sourced in both conventional (treaty) law and customary international law (Air

Force Pamphlet, 1976:110-31).

----------' j

226

Journal of Political and Military Sociology

In short, though they now may have the capability to inflict cataclysmic
damage on the U.S., the magnitude of their crimes does not, per se, transform
terrorists into something other than criminals. Thus, perhaps the most
formidable threat to U.S. interests in the future is, by its very nature,
fundamentally a criminal challenge, albeit of unprecedented dimensions. This
presents significant philosophical issues.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
To be sure, philosophical reservations about the involvement of
military personnel in law enforcement activities did not arise solely with the
emergence of the challenge of catastrophic terrorism. Much concern has been
expressed over the years about the military's drug control activities, and this
uneasiness continues. Former secretary of the Navy John Lehman wrote
recently of the military's role in drug interdiction that "by accepting that new
(and I believe unconstitutional) mission, the services have become de facto
police. To involve the services in domestic law enforcement is to cross a
dangerous line in separation of powers" (Lehman, 1998:24; parenthetical in
original).
In this connection it is worth remembering that the genius of the
traditional American law enforcement system is that most police power is
diffused among thousands of communities. Most of these more or less
independent police agencies are subject to strict control by elected leaders at the
local or state level. The civilian control of the military, however, is centralized
in the President and national command authorities in Washington (Wisotsky,
1993: 17,19). This system works well when confronting a foreign threat,
markedly less well when employed domestically to interact with the citizenry
where force of arms is seldom the appropriate or necessary law enforcement
tactic.
The troublesome potential of the enhanced role of the military in
counter~terrorism is generating the most criticism. Former Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger condemned the proposals by saying that they were
"repugnant to democratic society" (as quoted by Kellman, 1995:6). Though
there are no current plans to expand military authority into direct law
enforcement (e.g., arrest/search authority), it is difficult to see how that could be
avoided in a situation that would likely border on mass chaos.
The previously discussed proposal to appoint a single military
commander for a "homeland defense" organization to handle such situations
causes one critic to warn about the risk of "mission creep." Gregory T. Nojem,
legislative counsel on national security for the American Civil Liberties Union,
says, "The danger is in the inevitable expansion of that authority so the military
gets involved in things like arresting people and investigating crimes .... It's
hard to believe that a soldier with a suspect in the sights of his M-I tank is well
positioned to protect that person's civil liberties" (as quoted by Broad and
Miller, 1999: 1).
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Obviously, those concerned with both civil liberties and domestic
security are rightly apprehensive about the outcome of the current debates. One
important step in setting the right course for the future would be establishing a
clear definition of the kinds of threats manifesting a true national security threat,
and those which present a law enforcement problem recognizing, of course, that
overlap can occur from time to time.
In considering this issue, it may be helpful to recall recent experience.
As discussed above, during the 1980s and 1990s there was a major effort to
transform the national drug issue into a national security threat suitable for the
application of military force. Though military intrusion in what was essentially
a law enforcement problem did grow, it fell short of full police-ization of the
armed forces.
Today, we face another peril, that of catastrophic terrorism. The nature
of this threat, if characterized as a national security risk, carries great potential
to force that next step. No one should suffer the illusion that military forces
could ever execute the laws with the same sensitivity to civil liberties as regular
police forces. To do so is at odds with the central imperatives of military
service. Moreover, a successful policization of the armed forces may well
render it incapable of defeating authentic external military threats.
What does the future hold? Secretary of Defense William Cohen
warned in 1997 that "terrorism is escalating to the point that citizens of the
United States may soon have to choose between civil liberties and more
intrusive forms of protection" (as quoted in Pexton, 1997:3). That may be so,
but employing military forces for internal security purposes will surely
exacerbate it. Confronting terrorism requires, among other things, an intensive
intelligence effort and aggressive investigative work. A military organization
adept at destroying targets and undermining enemy command and control
structures is not necessarily the best organization to do such work in a
democracy.
It must be pointed out that in the American experience any effort at
police-ization of the armed forces almost always arises from outside the military
establishment. In the case of catastrophic terrorism, the lack of any immediate
In reporting the proposed
alternative complicates short-term solutions.
terrorism-adapted "homeland defense" force, the Washington Post captured the
essence of the dilemma:
"Frankly, we are not seeking this job," said
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre.
He acknowledged that "most Americans"
are "apprehensive" about the military
getting involved in domestic policing and
CrISIS management.
"But we know we're
being asked to be involved because we have
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the only part of government that has the
resources that can be mobilized, " he added
(Graham, 1999:2).
A recent article in Foreign Affairs proposed a program for combating
catastrophic terrorism that will require some of the intrusiveness about which
Secretary Cohen warns and Deputy Secretary Hamre recognizes (Carter,
Deutch, and Zelikow, 1998:80). Still - except for certain aspects of the draft
National Terrorism Intelligence Center - it carefully excludes DoD from most
activities in the law enforcement realm. (DoD would, however, have a large
role in consequence management and preemptive and retaliatory strikes.)
Similarly, a Justice Department proposal to take the lead from DoD in counterterrorism preparedness by 2001 appears to be the direction the evolution should
take (Justice Department Poised ... , 1998: 14).
Such proposals have real potential. However, considerable work is
required for implementation. As these and other ideas are considered, it is vital
that inertia and the penchant for quick-fixes not allow responsibility for
countering catastrophic terrorism to permanently devolve to the armed forces.
The risks of doing so are very great, and we should not be seduced by absence
in modern times of significant abuses by the armed forces. The stakes are very
high. As Colonel Harry G. Summers, a decorated Army veteran and expert on
national security affairs, warns:
Like using fascism as a cure for the Great
Depression, the involvement of military
forces in civilian law enforcement could
prove to be a greater assault on our
democracy than any terrorist bombing, for it
could destroy that democracy's very
foundations (Summers, 1995: 17).
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